In the “High Court” Carter Trading (Pty) Ltd/Blignaut 2010 (2) SA 46 (ECP), the applicant and the defendant entered into an agreement to purchase goods in which the defendant owed the applicant a sum of money for the products sold. Since the defendant owed the applicant a sum of money on the due date, both parties entered into a written AOD. In the AOD, the defendant acknowledged that it was indebted to the applicant for the amount not paid under the goods sales contract between it and undertook to settle the debts on the due date set out in the AOD. In Adams/SA Motor Industry Employers Association 1981 (3) SA 1189 (A) in 1198-1199, the Tribunal found that there was a presumption against innovation and that, if an innovation was not contemplated, two commitments could be coexisted. These obligations would be interdependent and the creditor has no choice but to enforce the original commitment. Recognition of debts, sometimes called IOU, is evidence of a debt due, but differs from an obligation because it does not contain an explicit promise of payment. However, if the authorization to pay is accompanied by a payment obligation, it gives rise to an obligation within the meaning of the company. 4.3 On 12 April 2016, the applicant and the first accused entered into the contract of withdrawal and the recognition of the debt contract under the terms and conditions; One aspect of the NCA that has not yet been clarified is its application to the Debt Lawsuit (AODs). In the past, the courts have ruled on a case-by-case basis. However, recent case law suggests that the nature of the guilt demonstrated by the OCA is the determining factor in determining whether the LYA is regulated by the NCA.  In casu, the withdrawal agreement and the recognition of the debt agreement relate to an underlying agreement that is excluded from the law.
Therefore, the withdrawal agreement and the recognition of debts on the basis of Ratlou`s diktats (supra) are not credit contracts, as required by law, but on the basis of Ribeiro`s (supra) loan guarantees, as stipulated in section 8, paragraph 5, of the law). However, under Section 4 (2) (c) of the Act, it is excluded from the act, since the loan contract is not subject to the provisions of the act. In my view, the parties conclude almost without exception the AODs because the debtor has a high chance of not paying debts on the due date. As a result, the debtor is likely to be over-indebted at the time of the conclusion of an AOD. If the court considers an AOD to be a credit contract, it is possible that such an AOD constitutes, in these circumstances, reckless credits. The result could be that a court always suspends the strength and effect of AODs on the basis of reckless loans. It is a common business practice for companies to require problem debtors to sign payment plans in combination with debt recognitions (“AODs”). The reason for this practice is usually to try to expedite the collection of these debts in court when the debtor, more often than not, is late in the payment plan. Accordingly, the first defendant is liable to the applicant for R1,685,289.00, calculated on the basis of the elements of the debt (p. 7, para. 10). However, a person who grants a single credit of an amount that exceeds the threshold in the form of an AOD and does not intend to obtain successive LYDs is not required to be a registered lender.